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ARTICLES
CREDIT UNION CONVERSIONS: CHARTER
CHOICES AND CONTROVERSY
MICHAEL W. BRIGGS'
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of banking industry consolidation, the variety
and number of financial institutions in the United States remains
without equal, and includes national and state banks, federal and state
savings institutions, and federal and state credit unions.
2  These
financial institution charters developed to meet similar yet distinct
objectives, and each continues to offer its own unique advantages and
historical benefits. While the distinctions in functions and powers have
diminished over time, Congress and the states continue to permit
different forms of ownership. Commercial banks are limited to stock
ownership and credit unions are limited to the mutual form as
membership institutions, while savings institutions may be mutual or
stockholder owned institutions. This variety of financial institutions
supports equally varied business models in diverse markets serving the
ever expanding financial service needs of American consumers and
businesses.
Over time, as businesses evolve, customer demands grow, and
other circumstances change, many financial institutions have found it
necessary to change their form of charter to one that more closely aligns
with their business objectives and customer demands. Charter
1. Member, The Florida Bar; Counsel to Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger &
Hollander, LLC, Baltimore Maryland.
2. As of September 30, 2005, there were 8,854 institutions insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statisticaV/
stats/2005sep/industry.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2006). The 2005 Directory of Federally
Insured Credit Unions includes more than 9,000 federal and state credit unions. NATIONAL
CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, 2005 DIRECTORY OF FEDERALLY INSURED CREDIT UNIONS,
http://www.ncua.gov/data/directory/2005/2005CuDirectory.Pdf
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conversions are contemplated and prescribed by statute and regulation.3
There are a variety of reasons that might lead to a charter conversion
decision, including new or different strategic initiatives and changing
market demographics, as well as financial and regulatory
considerations. One such charter conversion option that has generated a
fair amount of interest and controversy recently involves the conversion
of credit unions to mutual savings banks or mutual savings associations.
Why have these conversions led to controversy or even litigation?
Interest in credit union conversions seems to result, in part, from
the unique historical role credit unions have played in delivering
financial services to American consumers 4 and, in part, from credit
unions' strong competitive position. Interest is strong despite the fact
that credit unions in the aggregate comprise a relatively small portion of
overall financial institution assets.6 At the outset, it is worth an obvious
note that no discussion involving credit unions occurs without some
reference to the debate over credit unions' tax-exempt status.
Nevertheless, consideration of issues surrounding the taxation of credit
unions is beyond the scope of this article.7
Some regulators and credit union advocates see conversion of
credit unions to mutual savings institutions and the possibility of future
mutual-to-stock conversions as threats to member voting rights and the
credit union charter itself. Others see credit union conversions as an
appropriate business choice that all institutions should be free to make
without undue interference. Supporters of "charter choice" believe
existing statutes and regulations appropriately take into account member
voting interests and ensure that all constituents in a conversion
transaction are treated fairly. Those who have argued against recent
3. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2) (2005) (permitting conversion of insured credit
union to mutual savings banks or mutual savings association); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(3) (2005)(permitting conversion of federal savings association to state-chartered savings bank); 12U.S.C. § 214 et seq. (2005) (permitting conversion of national bank to state-chartered bank).
4. William R. Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, Credit Unions Make Friends - But Not
with Bankers, THE REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 2003.
5. See, e.g., Timothy Hannan, The Impact of Credit Unions on the Rates Offered ForRetail Deposits by Banks and Thrift Institutions, (Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, Working Paper 2003-2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2003/200306/200306pap.pdf.
6. FDIC supra note 2.
7. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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conversion efforts caution that additional credit union member
protections are needed.
Although the level and tenor of the debate may have increased
with news of recent conversions and attempts to convert, it is important
to keep in mind that only a comparative handful of the thousands of
credit unions in the United States have chosen to convert since
legislative changes resulted in a more streamlined conversion process in
1998.8 The vast majority of credit unions today serve their membership
successfully, while enjoying strong consumer satisfaction and loyalty.
In fact, credit unions consistently rank at the top among financial
institutions in customer satisfaction surveys.
9
II. UNIQUE ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF CREDIT UNIONS IN AMERICAN
FINANCIAL SERVICES
A credit union is a cooperative financial institution owned by its
members who are linked by a common bond.'
° Each credit union
member is required to purchase shares in the institution."1 The purchase
of a share allows a member to become an owner with the right to vote,
and to take advantage of the services offered by the 
credit union.1 2
Regardless of the number of shares held, no credit union member has
more than one vote. 3 Credit unions, like mutual savings banks and
mutual savings institutions, do not operate to generate shareholder
results. Credit unions redeploy net income and profits back into the
organization's operations and services. Credit unions generally are
governed by a voluntary board of directors.
1 4
8. National Association of Federal Credit Unions, Credit Union Conversions-NAFCU
Policy Recommendations at App. A (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.nafcu.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/Legislation-Regulation/Studies/ConversionsWhitePaper'pdf"
9. Charles Keenan, Customer Service Comeback Boosts Satisfaction Ratings, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 18, 2005, at 6A.
10. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(a) (2005).
12. National Credit Union Association, Interpretative Ruling and Policy Statement 03-
01 (May 15, 2003), http://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/charter manual/2003
ChateringandFOMManual.pdf (noting each state has specific laws and regulations
governing the operations of its chartered credit unions). For discussion purposes, this article
focuses on the applicable federal laws and regulations governing the chartering and
operation of credit unions.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1760 (2005).
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 1761a (2005).
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Credit unions may be chartered at either the federal or state
level.'" Like banks and savings institutions, credit unions are regulated
financial institutions. 6 Unlike other cooperative financial institutions,
however, a credit union operates to serve a more narrowly defined
membership. Credit unions work to encourage thrift among their
members, create sources of credit at fair and reasonable rates of interest,
and provide an opportunity for their members to "use and control their
resources on a democratic basis in order to improve their economic and
social condition."'' 7
Today's credit unions trace their history to the nineteenth
century when the first credit unions were formed in Europe to respond
to the credit needs of farmers and others who were unable to obtain
reasonable financing through traditional means.' 8 The credit union
concept crossed the Atlantic in 1900 when the first credit union in North
America, La Caisse Populaire de Levis, was organized in Quebec.' 9 In
1909, Massachusetts passed the first credit union law and the first credit
union was established that same year in neighboring New Hampshire.2 °
Credit unions are not uniquely cooperative, however, nor were
credit unions the first cooperative financial institutions in the United
States. Nearly 100 years before the first credit union opened for
business, the first mutual savings banks opened in 1816 when the
Philadelphia Savings Fund Society began operations on a voluntary
basis and the Provident Institution for Savings in Boston received its
charter.2' Credit unions and mutual savings institutions share common
characteristics in that members control the institution and net earnings
inure to the benefit of depositors or share account holders.22
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1775 (2005). A majority of states have credit union chartering
acts; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. §§ 6-101 - 6-909 (LexisNexis 2005).
16. Credit unions are subject to most, but not all, of the same regulations that apply to
other insured depository institutions. For example, credit unions are not subject to the
requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2902 (2005).
17. FLA. STAT. § 657.003 (2005).
18. National Credit Union Administration, History of Credit Unions, http://www.ncua.
gov/AboutNCUA/historyCU.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2006).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. FDIC, History of the Eighties, Volume , An Examination of the Banking Crises of
the 1980s and early 1990s, at 212 (Dec. 1997) (citations omitted)
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/histoy/historical/211 
_234.pdf.
22. Brief for America's Community Bankers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
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Originally, mutual savings banks were organized under state law
to help the working and lower classes by providing a safe place where
the small saver, at the time unwelcome by many commercial banks,
could deposit modest amounts of money. Names such as Dime Savings
and Salem Five Cents are reminders of these institutions' original
marketing focus. Mutual savings banks were formed largely as a result
of philanthropic support. Wealthy industrialists, concentrated in the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, provided the start-up capital and served as
bank management, overseeing operations without compensation. 3
Similar to a mutual savings bank, a federal mutual savings association is
a non-stock, insured depository institution chartered by the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) under the Home Owners' Loan Act. 24 Federal
mutual savings associations operate just like stock-owned federal thrifts,
except that the depositors in a mutual savings association hold the
ownership rights.25
Mutual savings institutions, like credit unions, developed
around management strategies that are focused on the long-term success
of the institution rather than on short-term shareholder results. Like
other banking institutions, mutual institutions are governed by a board
of directors that has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the
institution is run in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with all
laws and regulations. Because mutual savings institutions also do not
face quarterly earnings result pressures, most are deeply involved in
philanthropic activities within their communities.
26
To ensure that credit unions serve their intended select groups of
individuals, federal and state chartering laws limit their fields of
membership. Fields of membership include groups of individuals
sharing a common bond. A common bond may be occupational
(employees of the firm), associational (such as members of a religious
Petitioners, Community Credit Union, v. National Credit Union Admin., et al., No. 4:05 CV
285 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005) (dismissing with prejudice under terms of voluntary
stipulation order on Sep. 08, 2005).
23. History of the Eighties, supra, note 21 at 212.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (2005).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Hearing on GSE Reform Before Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 109th Cong. 8-9 (2005) (testimony of Joseph F.
Conners, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Beneficial Savings Bank),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/030905jc.pdf.
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or fraternal organization) or geographical.27 Under the Federal Credit
Union Act (FCUA), membership in any federal credit union is limited
to one of the following categories:
1. One group that has a common bond of occupation or association;
2. More than one group -
a. Each of which having a common bond of occupation or
association (within the group); and
b. The number of members of each such group not
exceeding the applicable numerical limitation; or
3. Persons or organizations within a well-defined local community,
neighborhood, or rural district.
28
State credit union chartering acts include similar field of membership
restrictions.29
Owing to their limited fields of membership and non-profit form
of organization, credit unions enjoy tax-exempt status under federal and
many state tax laws. The Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal
income taxation federal and state credit unions "without capital stock
organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit., 30 The
combination of tax-exempt status and membership orientation means
that credit unions generally can, and do, offer higher rates of interest on
savings deposits, or credit union share accounts, and lower rates of
interest on loans.3' Given this unique structure, and although credit
union assets remain a small fraction of the total assets of FDIC-insured
depository institutions, they are effective competitors in many markets.
27. Emmons & Schmid, supra note 4, at 6.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b) (2005). Except as provided in the FCUA, multiple common-
bond credit unions are limited to 3,000 members. Id.
29. See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 122.051 (Vernon 2005).
30. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A) (2005). Prior to 1952, savings and loans and mutual
savings banks also were tax-exempt because of similar non-profit strategic missions. In
1952, the tax exemption was repealed and these entities became subject to the regular
corporate income tax. See America's Community Bankers, Brief History of Taxation of
Mutual Institutions, http://www.acbankers.org/mutuals/mutualhistory.asp (last visited Jan. 1,
2006).
31. See, e.g., National Association of Federal Credit Unions, surpa note 8, at 3.
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While most credit unions are small, there are nearly 100 credit unions
with assets in excess of $1 billion.32
III. CONVERTING TO A MUTUAL SAVINGS BANK OR MUTUAL SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION CHARTER
In recent years, several credit unions have made the decision to
convert to a mutual savings bank or mutual savings association charter.
There are a variety of reasons underlying these conversions, but
typically the reasons articulated include gaining the ability to raise
capital for growth and expansion at a future date, either through the
formation of a mutual holding company or the total conversion to a
stock-owned institution, diversifying the institution's customer-member
base, or entering new lines of business (or expanding existing business
lines), which may be restricted under the institution's existing credit
union charter.33 Some have pointed to generally lower minimum capital
requirements for FDIC-insured depository institutions as a competitive
concern for credit unions that may lead to a conversion, although an
obvious counterpoint is the financial impact of a credit union's tax-
exempt status.34
Opponents of credit union conversions have cast doubt on the
business reasons articulated in support of proposed conversions, and
they argue that the converting institutions have failed to adequately
inform their members regarding their potential loss of control over the
institution. Many have expressed concerns that a credit union
conversion is the first step toward a conversion to a stock form of
ownership and question whether economic incentives for directors and
senior management may be a driving factor in the decision to take the
first conversion step from a credit union charter.35
32. 2005 Directory of Federally Insured Credit Unions, supra note 2, at 170-171.
33. Tom Henderson, Credit Union Files to Be Bank, CRAINs DETROIT BusINEss, Dec.
19, 2005, available at 2005 WL 20701632.
34. See generally, 12 C.F.R. §§ 565, 567, 702; see also, Financial Services Regulatory
Relief Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3505 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Robert M. Fenner, General
Counsel, National Credit Union Administration), available at http://www.ncua.gov/news
/speeches/2005/Fenner/Fenner-09-22-2005.pdf.
35. See Henderson supra note 33.
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Credit union conversions are subject to specific regulatory
requirements regarding notice to the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), the federal regulator of credit unions, notice of
voting procedures, and limits on financial compensation to directors and
senior management.36 A converting credit union must apply for prior
approval from the chartering agency to which jurisdiction the credit
union seeks to convert.37 If the converted mutual savings association
subsequently elects to proceed to a second-step, mutual-to-stock
conversion, extensive regulations govern these transactions. 8
Prior to 1998, the FCUA required that a converting credit union
obtain prior approval from the NCUA.39 In 1998, Congress passed the
Credit Union Membership Access Act ("CUMAA"), 40  which
substantially reduced the NCUA's role in a credit union conversion
transaction. Specifically, section 1785 was revised to eliminate the
agency's substantive approval authority, and now provides that:
[A]n insured credit union may convert to a mutual
savings bank or savings association (if the savings
association is mutual in form) . . . without the prior
approval of the [NCUA] Board, subject to the
requirements and procedures set forth in the laws and
regulations governing mutual savings banks and savings
associations.4'
In amending the FCUA, Congress replaced the NCUA's
transaction approval authority with a narrower authority to administer
the process by which member votes are held to consider a conversion
proposal.42 The NCUA still must receive prior notice of the proposed
conversion.43 The CUMAA amendments to the FCUA were intended to
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2) (2005).
37. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 543.8-543.9 (2005).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 563b (2005).
39. 12 U.S.C. 1785(b)(1) (1994).
40. Pub. L. No. 105-219, 112 Stat. 913 (1998).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2)(A) (2005).
42. See id. § 1785(b)(2)(G).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.5 (2005).
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make the NCUA's conversion regulations more consistent with those of
the other federal financial institution regulators, including the OTS.44
Following enactment of the CUMAA, the NCUA adopted
regulations to implement the requirements for administration and
supervision of a converting credit union's voting process. Under the
NCUA's revised regulations, a board of directors of a converting credit
union must approve the transaction by a majority vote of those voting
and set a date for a membership vote on the proposal.45 In turn, the
membership must approve the proposal by a majority vote of those
members voting. 46 A credit union member may vote on the proposed
conversion in person at a special meeting held on the date set by the
board of directors or, alternatively, by written secret ballot.47 Within ten
calendar days after the vote is taken, the converting credit union's board
of directors must certify the results of the vote to the NCUA's regional
director, and must also certify that there have been no material changes
to the written materials submitted in advance to the NCUA from those
materials submitted to members, though prior submission to the NCUA
is not required, or provide the revised materials along with an
explanation of the changes.48
The credit union seeking to convert must provide three notices
of the proposed transaction to its membership at intervals of ninety,
sixty and thirty calendar days prior to the membership vote.49 The
member notice must "adequately describe the purpose and subject
matter of the vote to be taken" and must include:
* A disclosure that the conversion from a credit union to a
mutual savings bank could lead to members losing their
ownership interests in the credit union if the mutual savings
bank subsequently converts to a stock institution and the
members do not become stockholders;
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2)(G) (2005).
45. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.3 (2005).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.4(a) (2005). Proxy voting is not permitted under the FCUA. 12
U.S.C. § 1760 (2005).
47. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.4(a) (2005).
48. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.6 (2005).
49. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.4(b) (2005).
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" A disclosure of how the conversion from a credit union to a
mutual savings bank will affect members' voting rights; and
* A disclosure of any conversion related economic benefits
that a director or senior management official may receive,
including receipt of, or an increase in, compensation and an
explanation of any foreseeable stock related benefits
associated with a subsequent conversion to a stock
institution. Such an explanation must include a comparison
of the opportunities to acquire stock that are available to
officials and employees, as compared with those
opportunities available to the general membership. °
In connection with the required notice to its members, the
NCUA regulations also direct a converting credit union to include a
statement that, at the time of conversion, the credit union does or does
not intend to: convert to a stock institution; provide any compensation
to previously uncompensated directors or increase compensation or
other conversion related benefits, such as stock related benefits, to
directors and senior management officials; or determine member voting
rights based on account balances. 1
In 2005, the NCUA further revised its regulations implementing
section 1785's voting administration requirements. In particular, the
NCUA added an additional, boxed disclosure requirement. Under
revised regulation section 708a.4, all communications to members
regarding the proposed conversion must include a disclosure, in
substantially the form below:
The National Credit Union Administration, the federal government
agency that supervises credit unions, requires [insert name of credit
union] to provide the following disclosures.
1. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL. In a credit union, every member
has an equal vote in the election of directors and other matters
concerning ownership and control. In a mutual savings bank,
50. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.4(c)(d)(1) (2005).
51. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.4(d)(2) (2005).
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ACCOUNT HOLDERS WITH LARGER BALANCES USUALLY
HAVE MORE VOTES AND, THUS, GREATER CONTROL.
2. EXPENSES AND THEIR EFFECT ON RATES AND SERVICES.
Most credit union directors and committee members serve on a
volunteer basis. Directors of a mutual savings bank are compensated.
Credit unions are exempt from federal tax and most state taxes. Mutual
savings banks pay taxes, including federal income tax. If [insert name of
credit union] converts to a mutual savings bank, these ADDITIONAL
EXPENSES MAY CONTRIBUTE TO LOWER SAVINGS RATES,
HIGHER LOAN RATES, OR ADDITIONAL FEES FOR SERVICES.
3. SUBSEQUENT CONVERSION TO STOCK INSTITUTION.
Conversion to a mutual savings bank is often the first step in a two-step
process to convert to a stock-issuing bank or holding company. In a
typical conversion to the stock form of ownership, the EXECUTIVES
OF THE INSTITUTION PROFIT BY OBTAINING STOCK FAR IN
EXCESS OF THAT AVAILABLE TO THE INSTITUTION'S
MEMBERS.
4. COSTS OF CONVERSION. The costs of converting a credit union to
a mutual savings bank are paid from the credit union's current and
accumulated earnings. Because accumulated earnings are capital and
represent members' ownership interests in a credit union, the
conversion costs reduce members' ownership interests. As of [insert
date], [insert name of credit union] estimates THE CONVERSION
WILL COST [INSERT DOLLAR AMOUNT] IN TOTAL. That total
amount is further broken down as follows: [itemize the costs of all
expenses related to the conversion including printing fees, postage fees,
advertising, consulting and professional fees, legal fees, staff time, the
cost of holding a special meeting, conducting the vote, and any other
expenses incurred] .
In addition to being boxed, the additional disclosures must
appear at least one font size larger than any other text (not including
52. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.4(e) (2005).
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headings) used in the communications.53 These additional disclosures
were intended to address NCUA concerns that members of converting
credit unions did not have a complete understanding of the full impact
of their votes in a credit union conversion.54
Most converting credit unions have adopted a federal mutual
savings association charter." The OTS, as primary regulator of federal
savings institutions, both stock and mutual, has adopted extensive
conversion regulations and procedures.56 Under OTS regulations, any
"depository institution"57 may convert to a federal mutual savings
association, provided that:
* The depository institution will be FDIC-insured following
its conversion;58
* The depository institution complies with all applicable state
and federal statutes and OTS policies, and obtains all
necessary regulatory and member approvals; and
* The resulting federal mutual savings association conforms,
within the time prescribed by the OTS, to the requirements
of section 5(c) of the Home Owners' Loan Act regarding
permissible loans and investments.59  Among the
requirements to which a converting credit union must
conform following its conversion is the Qualified Thrift
Lender ("QTL") test, which requires an OTS-chartered
institution to hold QTL investments equal to at least 65% of
its portfolio assets or, alternatively, to qualify as a domestic
building and loan association under the Internal Revenue
53. Id.
54. 70 Fed. Reg. 4005 (Jan. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 708a).
55. Nat'l Assoc. of Fed. Credit Unions, supra note 8.
56. 12 C.F.R. §§ 543.8-9 (2005).
57. For purposes of the conversion rules, a "depository institution" means any
commercial bank (including a private bank), a savings bank, a trust company, a savings and
loan association, a building and loan association, a homestead association, a cooperative
bank, an industrial bank or a credit union, chartered in the United States and having its
principal office located in the United States. 12 C.F.R. § 552.13 (2005).
58. At the time a converting credit union files its application to convert, it also must
submit an application to the FDIC for federal deposit insurance. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815
(2005).
59. 12 C.F.R. § 543.8(a)(3) (2005).
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Code.6° While some converting credit unions might fail to
meet the QTL test immediately upon conversion, the OTS
can and does grant waivers to allow phased-in compliance
in order to avoid unnecessary disruptions in an institution's
operations or balance sheet, which could give rise to
61
supervisory concerns.
A converting credit union's board of directors must approve the
transaction before application can be made to the OTS.62 The
application must include a conversion plan that specifies the home and
branch office locations, and provides for adequate reserves and surplus,
of the resulting institution.63 In addition, the OTS requires that all
applicants for an OTS charter make application for membership in the
appropriate Federal Home Loan Bank.64 Under NCUA regulations,
meanwhile, the membership vote in favor of a conversion must be
reviewed and verified by the regulatory agency that will have
jurisdiction following the conversion.65
IV. CONVERSION CONTROVERSIES
Concerns and opposition over credit union conversions have
recently centered on the potential for diminished voting rights following
a conversion, a lack of sufficient member participation in conversion
votes (i.e., too small a percentage of the total credit union membership
making these critical decisions), and the potential economic windfall
that credit union management could receive in the event of a subsequent
conversion to a stock form of ownership.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1) (2005). The Internal Revenue Code defines "domestic
building and loan association" in I.R.C. § 7701 (a)(19) (2005).
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(2). The phased-in approach also helps avoid the
negative tax consequences that could result from immediate changes in an institution's
balance sheet.
62. 12 C.F.R. § 543.9(a)(1) (2005).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 543.9(b) (2005).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 543.9(c)(4) (2005).
65. 12 C.F.R. § 708a.8 (2005).
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A. Diminished Voting Rights
Each credit union member has one vote to cast, including in a
vote on conversion. When the NCUA adopted the boxed disclosure
requirements in early 2005, the revisions reflected the NCUA's
concerns that conversions were being approved by credit union
members who were not fully informed and that disclosures under
existing disclosure rules might be inaccurate or misleading.6
A federal mutual charter grants depositors one vote per $100 of
deposits with an upward cap of 1,000 votes per member.
Alternatively, a federal mutual institution may provide that each of its
members is entitled to a number of votes per member of between one
and 1,000.68 For its part, the OTS has expressed concerns that the
revised NCUA boxed disclosures mandated by regulation section
708a.4(e) may themselves mislead rather than clarify.
In a decision certifying the conversion membership vote of
Community Credit Union of Plano, Texas ("Community"), the OTS
opined that
The first required disclosure [under section 708a.4(e)]
states that after a conversion to a mutual savings bank,
account holders with larger balances usually will have
greater control of the institution than members with
smaller account balances. While it is true that the
standard federal mutual charter provides for one vote for
each $100 (or portion thereof) of deposits up to a
maximum of 1,000 votes, it is extremely unlikely that
even a depositor with 1000 votes will have any
semblance of 'control' of the institution.69
The OTS also took issue with the third required disclosure under
section 708a.4(e) that
66. 70 Fed Reg. 4005 (Jan. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 708a).
67. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (2005).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 544.2(b)(4) (2005).
69. Off. Thrift Supervision. Order No. 2 005-23,at 4 (Jun. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/6/65023.pdf.
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implies that [credit union] members will have no
subsequent vote with respect to any conversion of the
institution to the stock form of ownership and that, if
there is a conversion to the stock form of ownership, the
Credit Union's executives will profit by obtaining stock
far in excess of that available to the institution's
members. In fact, even if the management of the credit
union that converts to a mutual savings bank charter
ultimately proposes to convert the institution to the stock
form of ownership, the members must approve that
conversion under a more rigorous vote requirement than
that pertaining to the conversion to a federal mutual
savings bank.7°
The OTS went on to state that, because Community had
included additional information with the section 708a.4(e) boxed
disclosures, "it is unnecessary for OTS to determine whether the
disclosures mandated by the NCUA's regulation would by themselves
be so misleading that they would taint the vote of a credit union's
members.'
B. Lack of Active Membership Voter Participation
Under the FCUA, an affirmative vote of a majority of the credit
union's members voting is required to approve a proposed conversion.
2
The NCUA has expressed concerns that the simple majority rule now in
place results in too few eligible voting members participating in the
voting process to approve a transaction that has significant ramifications
for the entire membership. This same concern was addressed in
proposed Congressional legislation in 2005. As introduced, the Credit
Union Regulatory Improvements Act of 2005 would require at least
20% participation by the eligible voting members in any vote on a
proposed conversion.73 The NCUA testified in support of this statutory
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 3, n.2.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2)(B) (2005).
73. H.R. 2317, 109th Cong. § 310 (2005).
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amendment and credit union advocacy groups expressed their support as
well.74
C. Conversion Compensation
Another often stated concern about conversions is that directors
and senior management stand to gain financially in the event the
converted credit union subsequently decides to convert to the stock
form of ownership. In one recent media report, the chief executive of
the Michigan Credit Union League was quoted in response to news that
a large Detroit area credit union had filed for approval to convert to a
bank as saying "it's well-documented that when credit unions convert to
banks, insiders are enriched. 75
When a credit union converts, the FCUA specifically limits the
compensation a director or senior management official of an insured
credit union may receive in connection with the conversion to director
fees and compensation and other benefits paid to director or other senior
management officials of the converted institution "in the ordinary
course of business. 76 Once a credit union converts to a mutual savings
institution, it may choose to complete a second-step conversion to a
stock form of ownership. In that event, OTS regulations circumscribe
the ownership stake that the institution's executives may acquire.77
Many mutual institutions do not take the next step to stock
ownership, however, because they find it difficult to fully deploy the
capital raised in any stock offering.78 Other mutual institutions choose
74. See JoAnn Johnson, Chairman, Nat'l Credit Union Admin., Financial Services
Regulatory Relief: The Regulators [sic] Views (June 9, 2005), available athttp://www.ncua.gov/news/speeches/2005/Johnson/RegReliefrestimonyJune2OO5.pdf
75. See Henderson supra note 33 (quoting David Adams, president and CEO, Michigan
Credit Union League).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2)(F) (2005).
77. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
78. Alan Kline, Why Mutual Holding Company Conversions May Be Cooling Off, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 4, 2006, at 1. Corporate governance responsibilities also has been raised as an
impediment to moving to a stock form of ownership, although the federal banking regulators
certainly have taken the position that the corporate governance standards applicable to
companies with registered securities also should be implemented by non-stock companies,
as appropriate.
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to form a mutual holding company, which allows the organization to
raise capital in a more deliberate and staged way.7 9
The benefits and likely success of any mutual-to-stock
conversion are dependent on a number of market factors, including
overall economic conditions and company valuations.8 ° Certainly, the
possibility exists that a credit union insider could benefit economically
from the upside of a second-step conversion, although the restrictions
on conversion compensation at the first stage, combined with the limits
imposed in mutual-to-stock conversions, are intended to speak to this
concern. Given these variable factors, certainly not all converted credit
unions choose to take the next step and convert to a stock form of
ownership. In fact, despite the economic motives many ascribe to credit
union management seeking to convert, a very small percentage of credit
unions actually have made this decision.8
If, and when, a converted credit union operating as a mutual
savings institution makes the decision to pursue a second-step
conversion and become stockholder owned, extensive conversion
regulations govern every aspect of the transaction, including required
pre-conversion meetings with the OTS, detailed requirements regarding
the plan of conversion, member votes, proxy solicitations, restrictions
and limitations in the offering and sale of the converting institution's
stock, and post-conversion obligations." A federal mutual savings bank
that seeks to convert must submit its plan of conversion to the
membership, which must approve the plan by a majority of the total
outstanding votes, unless applicable state law requires a higher
percentage vote.83 OTS regulations strictly limit the amount of stock
that any executive may purchase in a conversion.84 In addition, in an
OTS mutual-to-stock conversion transaction, the shares of stock must
be offered for sale in a prescribed order to:
" Eligible account holders;
* Tax-qualified employee stock ownership plans;
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(o) (2005); 12 C.F.R. Part 575 (2005).
80. See Kline, supra note 78.
81. See Nat'l Assoc. of Fed. Credit Unions, supra note 8.
82. 12 C.F.R. § 563b.225 (2005).
83. Id.
84. 12 C.F.R. §§ 563b.355, 563b.360, 563b.385 (2005).
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" Supplemental eligible account holders;
" Other voting members who have subscription rights; and
* The community and the general public.85
Taken together, OTS regulations are designed to help ensure the priority
position of depositors when a converting mutual savings bank offers its
stock for sale.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Litigation Over Disclosures
In 2005, credit union conversion controversy led to both
litigation and legislation. In September 2005, the NCUA and
Community8 6 settled a lawsuit involving Community's pre-conversion
notices to its membership.87 At issue in the litigation was whether
Community's disclosures regarding a pending conversion membership
vote had failed to comply with the boxed disclosure requirements of
section 708a.4(e) of the NCUA's regulations. The boxed disclosures,
which were placed on a separate sheet on the opposite side from a
rebuttal that Community had prepared in response to concerns over the
mandated language of the boxed disclosures, were mailed to some
Community members in a method that might not result in the member
opening and reviewing the boxed disclosures first. Community argued
that the disclosures met all of the requirements of the regulation and that
there was no regulatory requirement to fold the boxed disclosures in a
certain way so that they would appear first when a member opened the
envelope containing the conversion voting materials. Further,
Community noted that the transaction was overwhelmingly approved by
its members. As a result, the credit union argued that the NCUA had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to certify the memberhip's
approval of the conversion, and in violation of section 1785(b)(2)(G)(i)
85. 12 C.F.R. § 563b.320 (2005).
86. Omni Federal Credit Union, another converting Texas credit union, petitioned to
intervene, and was joined as a plaintiff in the litigation.
87. See generally Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, Community
Credit Union v. National Credit Union Admin., No. 4:05 CV 285 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 24,
2005).
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of the FCUA because the NCUA's actions were inconsistent with, and
more restrictive than, rules enacted by other financial regulators.
For its part, the NCUA argued that the disclosures provided by
the credit union failed to meet the requirements of NCUA regulations
aimed at preventing the disclosure of inaccurate or misleading
information to members considering a conversion proposal. In late
August, the United District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
issued a Report and Recommendation in which the magistrate judge
agreed with Community that the NCUA had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in failing to certify the member vote, finding that, "once
the vote is conducted in a fair and legal manner, the [NCUA] has no
authority or discretion to disapprove of the methods or procedures used
in the vote."88 The parties quickly moved to settle the dispute and
Community subsequently completed its conversion to become
ViewPoint Bank, an OTS chartered mutual savings association,
effective January 1, 2006.
B. Additional Legislative Action
The controversies surrounding credit union conversions have
caught the attention of some members of Congress. In July 2005,
Representative Patrick T. McHenry, a freshman Republican from North
Carolina, introduced H.R. 3206, the Credit Union Charter Choice Act,
89
in response to complaints that the NCUA inappropriately was
attempting to block conversions of credit unions that were authorized by
statute and regulation. The bipartisan bill9° resulted from the efforts of
banking trade groups, including America's Community Bankers, that
have been challenging the NCUA on its conversion rulemakings and
decisions. The bill proposes the following amendments to credit union
conversions under the FCUA:
* Eliminate the oversight role of NCUA with respect to
member votes on conversion proposals;
" Revise and streamline the notice requirements governing
88. Id. at 14.
89. H.R. 3206, 109th Cong. (2005).
90. The bill was co-sponsored by Reps. Paul E. Gillmor (R-Ohio), Sam Johnson (R-
Tex.), Peter T. King (R-N.Y.) and Edolphus Towns (D.-N.Y).
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credit union notifications to the NCUA Board regarding
planned conversions;
" Establish a NCUA Board approval process regarding
materials submitted by converting credit unions in
connection with such conversions;
* Require that member votes on proposed conversions be
conducted by secret ballot, with an independent inspector of
elections appointed by the converting credit union to receive
and tally the votes;
* Continue to require that the board of directors of the
converting credit union certify the vote results to the NCUA
Board, but deny the NCUA Board any further review or
approval authority over the conversion process, absent
evidence that fraud or reckless disregard for fairness during
the voting process had affected a vote outcome. 91
The bill would also prohibit the NCUA from requiring a
converting credit union to include in any required notice to members
regarding a proposed conversion transaction any information or
statements that:
(i) are speculative with respect to the future operations,
governance, or form of organization of the financial
institution that will result from the conversion, or may
occur after the completion of the conversion;
(ii) are inaccurate with respect to a proposed conversion of the
converting credit union or the application for a mutual
savings bank or savings association charter filed in
connection with the conversion;
(iii) conflict with regulations of other financial regulators,
including the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision,
related to the subsequent conversion of the resulting
financial institution from mutual to stock form;
(iv) distort the impact of conversion on the members of the
credit union; or
91. H.R. 3206, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
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(v) are attributable to the Board or state the Board's position
* 92
on conversions.
Opponents of efforts to limit the role of the NCUA in a credit
union conversion argue that such initiatives undermine the need for
transparency. Some credit union advocates argue that recent conversion
activities may be inconsistent with the following principles:
" Credit union member-owners should exercise their
democratic control of the institution;
* Conversion decisions should be based solely on member
interests and not on economic opportunity;
* Full, plain language disclosures are essential to the
conversion process;
" The NCUA and state credit union regulators should ensure
that converting credit union members understand the
conversion process and that the fiduciary obligations of
credit union board members are fully enforced.
93
VI. CONCLUSION
Credit unions are viable and powerful members of the financial
services sector. They have proven to be formidable competitors in the
fight for the American wallet. Mutual savings institutions have an
equally long track record of customer service and community
stewardship. These cooperative charters are important and
complementary components of the American financial services
marketplace. As their businesses evolve, some credit unions will
continue to find merit in a mutual savings institution charter. When that
happens, ideally, financial institution regulators will work together to
ensure that thoughtful, legitimate conversion decisions are supported by
regulations that are reasonable and consistent. Conversion regulations
should address the important interests of all involved constituencies,
92. Id.
93. Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n, Principles Regarding Credit Union Conversions (June
16, 2005), http://www.cuna.org/gov-affairs/legislative/issues/2005/conversions-principles
.htmi.
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including members and those responsible for the safe and sound
management and strategic direction of these valuable institutions.
